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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

only covers hazardous substances that are considered "waste." Caprio
failed to state that the sludge that Upjohn was releasing into the
environment was "waste" or that the expulsion of the sludge was a
"release into the environment." The court also dismissed the third
negligence count against Upjohn, finding that under section 52-577 of
the Connecticut General Statutes ("C.G.S."), Upjohn's activities "did
not involve the release of hazardous material from industrial waste
streams or toxic waste dumps in the ambient environment that would
potentially affect groundwater and drinking water."
Caprio then filed a motion seeking relief from the dismissal of
counts two and three based on newly discovered evidence supporting
allegations that the hazardous material was in "waste" form. The
district court granted Caprio's motion and ordered Caprio to file an
amended complaint stating that Caprio brought the action under
C.G.S. section 52-577 of CCWA. The amended complaint alleged that
Upjohn violated the CCWA by "releasing into the environment the
sludge from an industrial waste stream or toxic waste dump in a
manner that would potentially affect ground water and drinking water
as well as ambient air, land surfaces and surface waters."
Upjohn claimed that this amended complaint failed to identify a
legal basis and that there was no right to a private action under C.G.S.
section 52-577 of the CCWA. Caprio countered that his second cause
of action alleged negligence per se based on Upjohn's violation of the
standards set forth under the Connecticut Water Pollution Control Act
("CWPCA"). CWPCA states that the "pollution of the waters of the
state is inimical to the public health, safety and welfare of the
inhabitants of the state" and that "no person or municipality shall
cause pollution of any of the waters of the state or maintain a
discharge of any treated or untreated wastes."
The court found that Caprio, as a resident of Connecticut, was
within the class of persons that the statute was intended to protect and
that Caprio's allegations established that he was a potential victim of
pollution or hazardous waste discharged into the water of Connecticut.
Therefore, this court dismissed Upjohn's motion to dismiss the second
cause of action.
Colleen M. Cooley

Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho 2001)
(holding that "navigable waters" as defined in the Clean Water Act
("CWA") include non-navigable waters that are tributary to navigable
waters and that the CWA extends federal jurisdiction over
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface waters that are
themselves waters of the United States).
The Idaho Rural Council ("IRC") brought this action againstJacob
and Henry Bosma ("Bosmas"), owners and operators of Grand View
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Dairy ("Dairy"), for violating provisions of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Dairy's National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit, by polluting waters of the United States.
To establish a viable claim based on CWA requirements, the claimant
must allege that the adverse party discharged or added a pollutant to
navigable waters from a point source. The parties stipulated that the
Dairy constituted a point source under the CWA.
The Bosmas moved for summary judgment based on three factors:
(1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the IRC was
unable to establish a viable claim under the CWA because the Butler
and Walker Springs were not waters of the United States as there
defined; and (3) the "diligent prosecution defense," and the doctrine
of "unclean hands."
The Bosmas challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction
claiming that the IRC did not have standing and the case was moot. In
addition, the Bosmas argued that Butler and Walker Springs were not
waters of the United States as defined by the CWA. The court held
that the IRC had standing because the pollution of the water directly
affected members of the IRC. The court further held the case was not
moot because the voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not
deprive a federal court of its right to determine the legality of the
practice and the Bosmas were free to resume the behavior in the
future if the court did not rule.
The court addressed the subject matter jurisdiction issue and
whether the IRC stated a claim under the CWA with the same
reasoning. The court followed the Supreme Court's decisions in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers and InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette. In these cases, the
Supreme Court held that the term "navigable waters," as referred to in
the CWA, and defined therein includes "almost any body of surface
water that might affect interstate commerce," as well as "at least some
waters that are not navigable in the classical sense, such as nonnavigable tributaries and streams." The court reasoned that Butler
and Walker Springs were sufficiently connected through surface water
to Clover Creek, a navigable stream, as to fall within the definition of
waters of the United States.
The Bosmas also protested the IRC's inclusion of pollution
resulting from the hydrological connection between Butler and
Walker Springs and groundwater. The Bosmas argued that such a
connection cannot lead to a violation of the CWA. After examining
the legislative history and intent behind the enactment of the CWA,
the court held that Congress did not intend to exclude regulation
discharges into hydrologically connected groundwater which adversely
affect surface water. Using this reasoning, the court held that the
CWA extends federal jurisdiction over groundwater that was
hydrologically connected to surface waters that are themselves waters
of the United States. The court emphasized that it would not be
sufficient for the IRC to only allege groundwater pollution and then to
assert a general hydrological connection between all waters. The court
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held that the IRC must trace the pollutants from their source to
surface waters in order to state a claim under the CWA.
Finally, the court held that the affirmative defenses of diligent
prosecution and the doctrine of unclean hands were inapplicable for
the Bosmas.
Sarah A. Hubbard

United States v. Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d 983 (N.D. I., 2001) (holding
Krilich's ultra vires arguments, as well as other decree modification
arguments were insufficient to warrant a motion to vacate or modify a
consensual decree).
In 1992, the parties to the case entered into a consent decree
regarding violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Following this,
the United States contended that Krilich violated decree provisions on
part of the property subject to the decree. The government presented
the violation on stipulated and asserted facts. The trial court held that
Krilich violated decree mitigation plan deadlines on the Royce
Property. The court issued a penalty, which was upheld in a 1997
appeal. In 1998, Krilich moved to bar enforcement of the penalty
pursuant to Federal 'Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In so doing,
Krilich argued the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the mitigation
plan deadlines. The court denied relief. Krilich appealed, but the
court held that Krilich consented to the jurisdiction of the court by
entering the 1992 decree.
Krilich brought this motion in February 2001 on two bases. First,
Krilich argued that the Supreme Court opinion in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers warranted
vacation of the decree. Second, Krilich asserted that, in light of the
change of law represented in Solid Waste, the decree should have been
modified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (5) which
provides relief from judgment or order made in mistake.
In Solid Waste, the United States Supreme Court held the Army
Corps' "Migratory Bird Rule" unenforceable because it exceeded the
authority granted to the Corps under the CWA. Krilich contended
that Solid Waste made clear that none of the waters on the Royce
property were navigable waters subject to the CWA. Krilich argued
that because those waters were not under federal jurisdiction, the
United States had no authority to enter into the decree.
The court denied Krilich's motion to vacate the consent decree.
The argument that the decree was ultra vires, or void as beyond the
United States authority failed for four reasons. First, the government
agreement was not outside its authority because part of the property at
issue in the decree, the Sullivan Lake area, contains wetlands subject to
the CWA, even if Krilich's contentions regarding the Royce property
were correct. Second, if the government had gone beyond its
authority, that would not void the judgment as it would void a

